Freud vs. Marx (/FK)
“No more is assumed than that the science of society must coincide with the history of the development of the economic conditions of society, usually called by Marx ‘the conditions of production.’ It may benoted, in parentheses, that the Marxist term ‘production’ was certainly intended to be used in a wide sense, covering the whole economic process, including distribution and consumption. But these latter never received much attention from Marx and the Marxists. Their prevailing interest remained production in the narrow sense of the word. This is just another example of the naive historico-genetic attitude, of the belief that science must only ask for causes, so that, even in the realm of man-made things, it must ask ‘Who has made it?’ and ‘What is it made of?’ rather than ‘Who is going to use it?’ and‘ What for?’
Important for that purpose; and it is even possible to write a very good history of mathematical problems without referring to their‘economic background’ Important for that purpose; it is even possible to write a very good history of mathematical problems without referring to their economic background’
---In my opinion, the 'economic conditions’ or the ‘social relations’ of science are themes which can easily be overdone, and areliable to degenerate into platitude.)--- If we now proceed to a criticism as well as to an appreciation of Marx’s ‘historical materialism,’ or of so much of it as was presented so far, then we may distinguish two different aspects, first is historicism, the claim that the realm of social sciences coincides with that of the historical or evolutionary method, and especially with historical prophecy. This claim, I think, must be dismissed.
The second is economism (or‘materialism’), i.e. the claim that the economic organization of society, the organization of our exchange of matter with nature, is fundamental for all social institutions and for their historical development. This claim, I believe, is perfectly sound, so long as we take the term ‘fundamental’ in anordinary vague sense, not laying too much stress upon it. In other words, there can be no doubt that practically all social studies, whether institutional orhistorical, may profit if they are carried out with an eye to the ‘economic conditions’ of society. Even the history of an abstract science such asmathematics is no exception.’ In this sense, Marx’s economism can be said to represent an extremely valuable advance in the methods of social science. But, as I said before, we must not take the term ‘fundamental’ too seriously.
Marx himself undoubtedly did so. Owing to his Hegelian upbringing, he was influenced by the ancient distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘appearance,’ a distinction between what is ‘essential’ and what is ‘accidental.’ His own improvement upon Hegel (and Kant)in which he was inclined to see the identification of ‘reality ’(ourselves) with the material world (including man’s metabolism), and of ‘appearance’ with the world of thoughts or ideas. Thus all thoughts and ideas would have to be explained by reducing them to the underlying essential reality, i.e. to economic conditions and acceptance in hierarchy in relations.This philosophical view is certainly not much better than any other form of essentialism. And its repercussions in the field of method must result in anover-emphasis upon economism. For although the general importance of Marx ’seconomism can hardly be overrated, it is very easy to overrate the importance of the economic conditions in any particular case. This, however, is only aminor example of the danger of overstressing economism. Often it is sweepingly interpreted as the doctrine that all social development depends upon that of economic conditions, and especially upon the development of the physical means of production. But such a doctrine is palpably false. There is an interaction between economic conditions and ideas, and not simply a unilateral dependenceof the latter on the former. If anything, we might even assert that certain‘ideas,’ those which constitute our knowledge, are more fundamental than themore complex material means of production, as may be seen from the following consideration. Imagine that our economic system, including all machinery and all social organizations, was destroyed one day, but that technical and scientific knowledge was preserved. In such a case it might conceivably not take very long before it was reconstructed (on a smaller scale, and after many had starved). But imagine all knowledge of these matters to disappear, while the material things were preserved. This would be tantamount to what would happen if a savage tribe occupied a highly industrialized but deserted country. It would soon lead to the complete disappearance of all the material relics of civilization. (-) It may be noted in this connection that Marx’s friend, the poet H. Heine, thought very differently about these matters. ‘Markthis, ye proud men of action,’ he writes; ‘ye are nothing but unconscious instruments of the men of thought who, often in humblest seclusion, have appointed you to your inevitable task. Robespierre was merely the hand of Rousseau..’15 (Something like this might perhaps be said of the relationship between Lenin and Marx.). We see that Heine was, in Marx’s terminology, an idealist,and that he applied his idealistic interpretation of history to the French Revolution, which was one of the most important instances used by Marx in favour of his economism, and which indeed seemed to fit this doctrine not so badly if we compare it now with the Russian Revolution. Yet in spite of this heresy, Heine remained Marx’s friend.